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Capital flows to Turkey: financial 
implications and policy responses 
Mehmet Yörükoğlu and Ali Çufadar 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, capital inflows to almost all emerging countries have significantly increased. 
While it is possible to identify a number of push factors as the driving forces behind this 
development, country-specific pull factors have also played an important role. Indeed, most 
emerging countries have improved their macroeconomic stability by implementing sound 
monetary and fiscal policies and intensive structural reforms. This surge in capital inflows to 
the emerging economies has on the one hand supported economic growth but on the other 
hand introduced challenges for the policymakers of emerging economies with regard to 
monetary and financial stability. 
Since the deep economic and financial crisis of 2001, Turkey has been one of the emerging 
countries that has improved its economic fundamentals by implementing sound monetary 
and fiscal policies and has received intensive capital inflows. This paper aims to discuss the 
structural changes that took place in capital inflows to Turkey, the implications of these 
inflows for the financial system and potential policy responses.  
2.  Macroeconomic developments  
The historical data clearly reveal that 2002 was a turning point in recent Turkish economic 
history. After 2002, Turkey started a new IMF- and World Bank-endorsed stabilisation 
programme with strong disinflation, fiscal discipline and structural reforms in the banking 
system and privatisation targets. In addition to the stabilisation programme, the European 
Union (EU) convergence process has backed both the political and structural reforms as in 
December 2004 the European Council accepted 3 October 2005 as the start date of 
accession negotiations. The new framework of EU integration has anchored both political 
and structural reforms that have facilitated strong improvements in longer-term expectations 
and confidence in the sustainability of the reforms. 
Table 1 
Main trends in Turkish economy 
Averages 1984–90  1991–2001  2002–07 
Inflation 54.5  75.9  13.9 
 Standard  deviation  14.9  21.6  8.7 
GDP growth  5.7  2.9  6.8 
 Standard  deviation  3.6  5.4  1.9 
Total investment annual change  9.7  1.9  15.9 
  Private investment, annual change  13.1  2.4  18.4 
Primary surplus/GNP  –0.3  1.8  4.6 
 Productivity  growth  n/a  5.8  6.8 
Privatisation revenues (total, USD billions)  0.5  6.8  22.5 
Sources: TURKSTAT; Treasury; Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT). 468  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
As a result of strong commitments to the targets of the programme, these policies have 
yielded impressive disinflation, an increase in growth potential and improvements in most 
other macroeconomic variables. The average GDP growth rate increased from only 2.9% in 
the 1990s and early 2000s to 6.8% during 2002–07. Output volatility (measured as the 
standard deviation of growth) also fell over the same period from 5.4% to only 1.9%. 
Moreover, the average inflation rate declined from 75.9% in the 1990s and early 2000s to 
13.9% in 2002–07 (Table 1). 
The improvements and the trends can be better analysed with year-over-year data, as shown 
in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Main macroeconomic indicators 
(2001–07) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Inflation  68.5  29.7  18.4 9.3 7.7 9.6 8.4 
GDP  growth  –5.7 6.2 5.3 9.4 8.4 6.9 4.5 
Total investment annual 
change  –30.0 14.7 14.2 28.4 17.4 13.3  3.4 
Primary  surplus/GDP  5.1 4.0 4.9 5.5 5.1 4.6 3.5 
PSBR/GDP  12.2  10.0 7.3 3.6  –0.3  –2.0 0.0 
Real interest rates (ex post)  26.3 12.0 16.3 12.5  7.5  7.5  8.9 
Net public sector debt stock/ 
GDP  66.5 61.5 55.1 49.1 41.7 34.2 29.1 
 Net  domestic  debt/GDP  38.9  36.3 37.9 35.7 35.2 30.2 27.8 
 Net  external  debt/GDP  27.6 25.2 17.2 13.4  6.5  4.0  1.3 
Current account balance/GDP  1.9 –0.3 –2.5 –3.7 –4.6 –6.1 –5.7 
Sources: TURKSTAT; CBRT; SPO; Treasury. 
 
In the last six years, sustained fiscal discipline that yielded a 5% primary surplus on average 
has been the leading factor in the success of the programme. During this period, the 
resulting high economic growth has been mainly driven by rapid growth in private investment 
and a significant increase in manufacturing sector productivity. In addition to a notable 
increase in growth, the inflation rate has declined gradually from 70% to single digits. As 
fiscal discipline and privatisation have reduced the public sector pressure on interest rates 
and monetary policy oriented towards price stability reduced the inflation risk premium, real 
interest rates have declined to single digits from the last decade’s average of more than 
20%. Relatively lower interest rates, privatisation and fiscal discipline have helped the public 
sector borrowing requirement vanish, from around 10% of GDP towards a current situation in 
which net debt payments are implemented. As a result of these developments, the ratio of 
public sector net debt stock to GDP declined from 67% in 2001 to 29% in 2007. Even as the 
net domestic debt-to-GDP ratio declined from 38.9% to 27.8%, the net external debt stock-to-
GDP ratio declined from 27.6% to 1.3%. This impressive macroeconomic performance 
suggests that although global liquidity conditions have supported capital inflows to the 
country, the main determinant has been (favourable) country-specific factors.  BIS Papers No 44  469
 
 
3.  General trends in capital flows to Turkey  
Although the capital account in Turkey was fully liberalised in 1989, the weak economic 
performance of the economy and the volatile nature of Turkish financial markets, together 
with general volatility in emerging markets, had prevented significant and sustained capital 
inflows to the country.  
Table 3 
General trends in balance of payments statistics 
Balance of payments developments (total in billions of US dollars) 
  1984–
90 
1991–
99 
2000–
01  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2002–
07 
Current 
account  –4.8 –10.9  –6.2  –0.6  –7.5 –14.4 –22.1 –31.9 –37.6  –114.2
Capital and 
financial 
account 9.1  27.9  8.6  7.6  7.1 14.2 38.1 38.2 44.5  149.8
Foreign direct 
investments  2.2 5.4 3.0 1.0 1.3 2.0  9.0 19.1 19.9  52.2
Inflow 2.2  7.8  5.3  1.2  1.8  2.9 10.4 21.4 22.9  60.7
Outflow 0.0  –2.4  –2.4  –0.3  –0.5 –0.9 –1.4 –2.3 –3.0  –8.5
Portfolio 
investments  0.1 0.2  –8.5 0.9 2.5 7.5  11.6 8.1 1.9  32.4
Stocks 0.1  2.4  0.4  0.0  0.9 1.4 5.7 1.9 5.1  15.1
Domestic 
government 
securities 0.0  –2.1  –8.9  0.9 1.6 6.0 5.9 6.1  –3.3  17.4
Banking 
system  2.8 –2.4 –8.1 –3.2  2.1  0.6  8.7 –3.1 –1.4  3.6
Assets 
(securities 
and FX 
assets)  –2.4 –13.8  –1.7  –0.8  –0.2  –6.6 –1.6  –14.0 –5.3  –28.7
Liabilities 
(deposits 
and credits)  5.2  11.4  –6.3  –2.4  2.3 7.2  10.4  11.0 3.9  32.3
Non-bank 
sectors  7.1 20.7  3.0  0.9  1.6  7.2 13.8 17.3 28.7  69.5
Public sector 
and central 
bank –3.0  4.0  19.2  8.0  –0.3 –3.0 –4.9 –3.2 –4.5  –8.0
IMF –1.8  0.9  13.6  6.4  –0.1 –3.5 –5.4 –4.5 –4.0  –11.1
Other –1.2  3.0  5.6  1.6  –0.2 0.5 0.4 1.3  –0.6  3.1
Net errors and 
omissions  0.0 3.0  –4.8  –0.8 4.4 1.0 1.8  –0.2 1.1  7.4
Change in 
reserves
1  –4.3 –20.0  2.3  –6.2  –4.0  –0.8  –17.8 –6.1 –8.0  –43.0
1  Negative figures show an increase in reserves. 
Source: CBRT. 470  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
After 2002, thanks partly to favourable global liquidity conditions, but mainly to the economic 
transformation process of the Turkish economy, the amount and structure of foreign capital 
flows changed significantly. Foreign direct investment, private sector external borrowing and 
portfolio inflows increased steadily, as shown in Table 3.  
(a)  Foreign direct investment 
The most dramatic change in capital account items in recent years occurred in foreign direct 
investment (FDI). While total net FDI during the 1984–2001 period was only USD 10.6 billion, 
it increased to USD 52.2 billion in the last six years. Although the current account balance 
has worsened, the rapid increase in FDI after 2005 somewhat eased the concerns due to its 
non-debt nature and positive effect on the productive and competitive capacity of the Turkish 
economy. The prospects for EU accession and convergence expectations have also played 
an important role in increasing FDI flows to the country.  
For the time being, FDI inflows to Turkey are concentrated in the banking system and other 
service sectors such as telecommunications (Table 4). But considering the experience of 
other emerging countries, FDI inflows are expected to continue and spread to a broad range 
of industries through mergers and acquisitions and greenfield investments as the sound 
monetary and fiscal policies and the reform process of the country continue. 
 
Table 4 
Foreign direct investment by sector 
In millions of US dollars 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Banking    260  51  69 4,018 6,957  11,439 
Other  services  250  231  852 3,685 8,688 3,263 
Manufacturing  110 448  190 785  1,866  4,207 
Other  2 15  79 47  128  338 
Total 622  745  1,190  8,535  17,639  19,247 
Source: Treasury. 
 
(b) Portfolio  flows 
Until 2003, the instability of financial markets had limited foreign investor participation in bond 
(mainly domestic government securities) and stock markets. However, foreign portfolio 
inflows to bond and stock markets increased to USD 32.4 billion by 2007.  
The portfolio inflows consist of three items: (i) investments in stock markets; (ii) investments 
in bond markets; and (iii) investments in money markets. The money market investments of 
foreigners consist of swaps, deposits and credit transactions with domestic banks. Although 
investments in stock and securities markets are shown in the portfolio investment item in 
balance of payments statistics, money market transactions are generally shown under the 
assets and liabilities of the banking sector. In recent years, the volume of TRY swap and 
credit transactions increased to USD 17.2 billion. By adding USD 17.2 billion in money 
market transactions to the portfolio inflows, the cumulative sum of portfolio inflows reached 
USD 49.6 billion in the last six years (Table 5). BIS Papers No 44  471
 
 
Table 5 
Net foreign portfolio inflows 
In billions of US dollars 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Stocks    0.0 0.9 1.4 5.7 1.9 5.1 
Government securities  0.9 1.6 6.0 5.9 6.1  –3.3 
Money market instruments  0.0  0.2  0.1  4.7  6.5  5.7 
Total 0.9  2.7  7.5  16.3  14.6  7.6 
Source: CBRT. 
 
(c) Other  flows 
The net effect of the banking system on foreign capital flows has been relatively limited as it 
also intermediated capital outflows due to currency substitution. For the last two years, there 
have been USD 4.5 billion worth of net capital outflows through banking system transactions. 
While the total foreign exchange (FX) borrowing of banks from abroad was USD 16.6 billion 
during 1984–1999 period, it increased to USD 32.3 billion in the last six years. Likewise, the 
foreign assets of banks also increased from USD 16.2 billion to USD 28.7 billion.  
Despite the increase in the other sub-items of the capital account in recent years, the public 
sector has made net external debt payments as a result of fiscal discipline and privatisation 
revenues.  
Historically, one of the main sources of FX inflows to Turkey has been the rise in non-bank 
private sector debt. In recent years, as access to international markets has improved, the 
non-bank sectors have increased FX borrowing significantly, to finance their investments. 
The USD 69.5 billion increase in non-bank private sector debt in the last six years 
significantly outweighs the USD 30.8 billion increase during the 1984–2001 period. 
Furthermore, the maturity of borrowing shifted from short-term to medium- and longer-term, 
which in turn reduces the vulnerability of this sector to short-term tightening in global liquidity 
conditions. 
As a result of the increase in banking and non-banking sectors’ external borrowing, the gross 
external debt of Turkey increased from USD 113.6 billion in 2001 to USD 247.2 billion in 
2007. A decomposition of external debt shows that while the public sector debt stock has 
increased from USD 71.5 billion to USD 89.2 billion, the private sector debt stock has 
increased from USD 42.1 billion to USD 158.0 billion in recent years (Figure 1). But the 
increase in external debt mainly stemmed from longer-term private sector debt that reduces 
vulnerabilities. Since 2001, the short-term private sector external debt stock increased from 
USD 14.6 billion to USD 37.4 billion, while the medium- and long-term external debt stock 
increased from USD 27.5 billion to USD 120.7 billion.   472  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
Figure 1 
External debt stock 
In billions of US dollars 
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Source: Treasury.  
(d) Capital  outflows 
Against a significant increase in capital inflows to Turkey, we have also observed some 
capital outflows. There have been two main sources of capital outflows: (i) foreign direct 
investment abroad; and (ii) portfolio investment in international markets through the banking 
system. For the last six years, while FDI outflows were only USD 8.5 billion, portfolio outflows 
intermediated by the banking system were more significant.  
Residents in Turkey have been allowed to hold FX deposits in the banking system since 
1984. As a result of high volatility in domestic financial markets and a lack of confidence in 
the Turkish lira (TRY), the FX deposits of residents have gradually increased. The banks 
used these FX deposits to provide FX credits in domestic markets and to invest in FX assets 
abroad where some part of these assets has been investments in the Turkish Treasury’s 
eurobonds. Thus, the banks have continually intermediated foreign capital outflows except in 
the 2000–01 crisis years. This intermediation has increased in recent years as a result of the 
rise in FX deposits of residents. In the last six years, banking system foreign assets 
increased by USD 28.7 billion.  
In the last two years, the strong appreciation of the lira and volatility in the financial markets 
encouraged domestic residents (individuals and firms) to strongly increase their FX holdings, 
and the banking system increased its foreign assets, in turn causing heavy capital outflows. 
FX deposits of the residents in the banking system rose from USD 60 billion to USD 95 billion 
in last three years (Figure 2), which resulted in a USD 15 billion increase in banking system 
foreign assets.  
Although the increase in FX deposits of residents is the main source of capital outflows, it 
has two important positive implications for the stability in the domestic markets: (i) it 
dampens some of the appreciation pressure on the TRY and excess TRY liquidity; and (ii) it 
reduces the potential volatility of exchange rates and interest rates in case of external shocks 
as residents start to sell FX for domestic currency. As a matter of fact, this shock absorber 
characteristic has been clearly observed during recent volatility periods in the FX markets. BIS Papers No 44  473
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Some foreign portfolio investors call residents’ FX deposits an implicit insurance against 
volatility in FX and securities markets.  
Figure 2 
FX deposits and yearly change 
In billions of US dollars 
Source: CBRT. 
4.  The impact of increased capital flows on the domestic financial 
system 
(a)  The functioning of local capital markets 
As a result of new foreign portfolio inflows and accumulated interest earnings, the total market 
value of foreign portfolio investments increased from USD 5.3 billion to USD 120.3 billion over 
the last five years (Figure 3). The increase in foreign portfolio flows intensified especially after 
2004, as is the case in most other emerging countries. 
Moreover, the share of foreign investors in stock markets increased from 50% to 72% of free 
float while their share in government securities rose from 3% to 11.6% of the total domestic 
debt stock in the last three years (from May 2004 to January 2008; Figures 4 and 5). As a 
result of the expansion of foreign investors’ share in domestic markets, the impact of foreign 
portfolio flows on domestic markets has significantly increased. The rise in foreign investors’ 
share in these markets has also contributed to the liquidity of the markets.  474  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
Figure 3 
Non-residents’ portfolio stock 
In billions of US dollars 
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Source: CBRT. 
Figure 4 
Foreigners’ share in 
ISE stocks in free float  
Figure 5 
Foreigners’ share in 
government debt securities 
  
Source: Central Registry Agency.   Source: CBRT. 
Until some years ago, as a result of the lack of institutional and international investors, the 
high domestic debt stock was mostly carried on the banking system balance sheet in Turkey. 
The average maturity of deposits of the banking system was only three months, and holding 
government debt stock at longer maturities had posed a critical problem as the banking 
system was reluctant to assume the maturity mismatch risk. The average maturity of the 
domestic debt stock was very short, and the Treasury could only issue floating rate notes in 
the longer term. 
In recent years, however, the growing participation of foreign investors who are also eager to 
invest in fixed rate longer-term securities has reduced the dependence of the Treasury on 
the domestic banking system. In addition to the new investor base, a decisive monetary 
policy oriented towards price stability which reduced inflation risks has enabled the Treasury 
to issue longer-term fixed rate securities. In the last six years, the average maturity of the 
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government debt stock has increased from nine months to almost three years, with an 
average borrowing cost under the previous levels (Figure 6). 
Figure 6 
Average maturity of domestic debt stock 
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Source: Treasury. 
In addition to lengthening, the yield curve has become inverted (Figure 7), mainly because of 
the decline in inflation and the improvement in the credibility of the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey (CBRT). However, the concentration of foreign investors on longer 
maturities has also been critical in terms of shifts in the yield curve. Although the share of 
foreign investors in the total domestic debt stock is only 15%, their share in long-term fixed 
rate securities is almost 50%.  
Figure 7 
Nominal yield curve 
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On the other hand, as the share of foreign investors in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) 
has increased, they have become the main driver of market performance. As a result, ISE 
indices have tracked global market indices (Figure 8).  
Figure 8 
MSCI and ISE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg. 
Although it may be concluded that domestic pull factors in most emerging countries have 
outweighed push factors stemming from favourable global liquidity conditions, the increase in 
the share of foreign investors in domestic markets and financial integration led to a significant 
increase in the sensitivity of domestic asset prices to developments in mature markets.  
The simple correlation matrixes given in Table 6 shows how the sensitivity of Turkish assets 
to international market developments has increased.  
 
Table 6 
Correlation of Turkish asset returns with foreign markets 
 TRY  DJ  VIX  ISE 
2004–05      
TRY 1.00  –0.09  0.10  –0.43 
DJ –0.09  1.00  –0.77  0.08 
VIX 0.10  –0.77  1.00  –0.10 
ISE –0.43  0.08  –0.10  1.00 
2007      
TRY 1.00  –0.52  0.40  –0.68 
DJ –0.52  1.00  –0.82  0.40 
VIX 0.40  –0.82  1.00  –0.27 
ISE –0.68  0.40  –0.27  1.00 
Source: Bloomberg. 
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This suggests that despite the decoupling argument, domestic markets are even more 
susceptible to changes in global liquidity conditions and risk appetite now. 
(b)  Bank intermediation in the domestic economy 
In recent years the growth rate of the banking system balance sheet has reached 23% on 
average (Figure 9). There have been three main sources of this impressive growth: 
(i) deepening of the financial system as a result of an increase in confidence; (ii) a decline in 
nominal and real interest rates; and (iii) an increase in TRY and FX borrowing opportunities 
in international markets. The change in the structure of the banking system balance sheet 
has been more impressive. The high domestic debt, which in recent decades generally had 
crowded out lending to consumers and private sector, had been absorbed by the banking 
system. But the trend has dramatically changed since 2003 as fiscal discipline and higher 
foreign investment in government securities have reduced the pressure of domestic debt 
stocks on the balance sheet of the banking system. Thus, the banking system has focused 
on normal banking activities.  
As a result of the high primary surplus and privatisation revenues, the Treasury has reduced 
the domestic debt rollover ratios significantly below 100%, which in turn has increased 
loanable funds in the banking system for private sector and consumer credits (Figure 10).  
Figure 9 
Growth rate of banking system assets 
Figure 10 
The Treasury’s rollover ratio (TRY + FX) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CBRT.  Source: Treasury. 
In addition, the availability of longer-term TRY-denominated credit and swap transactions in 
international markets has enabled banks to increase the maturity of their loans. Foreign 
direct investment in the banking system and the increase in available funds for loans have 
resulted in heavy competition in the banking industry which has entailed some relaxation in 
credit conditions and a significant increase in credit maturities. 
All these factors have enabled banks to significantly increase their lending activity and the 
share of credits in their total assets. While the share of securities in the banking system’s 
balance sheet has decreased from 41% to around 28%, the share of credits has increased 
from 23% to 49% (Figure 11).  
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Figure 11 
Share of securities and loans in total assets 
 
Source: Treasury. 
Consequently, credit growth has increased to triple digits and supported domestic 
consumption and investment (Figures 12 and 13).  
Figure 12 
Growth rate of 
consumer credits 
Annual, in per cent 
Figure 13 
Growth rate of 
total credits 
Annual, in per cent 
Source: CBRT.  Source: CBRT. 
Even though the ratio of credits to GDP has been lower than in developed countries, it has 
dramatically increased from around 10% to 25% in last four years (Figures 14 and 15). The 
CBRT has always kept a close eye on domestic credit growth for both price and financial 
stability purposes.  
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Figure 14 
Ratio of consumer credits to GDP 
Figure 15 
Ratio of total credits to GDP 
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5. Policy  responses   
(a)  Exchange rate policy and liquidity management 
Since the adoption of the floating exchange rate regime in February 2001, exchange rates 
have been determined by supply and demand conditions in the market, and the CBRT has 
not had any exchange rate level target. But considering the importance of the level of foreign 
exchange reserves for reducing the unfavourable effects of potential shocks and for boosting 
confidence in the economy, the CBRT has conducted foreign exchange purchase operations 
in the market since 2002. Despite the CBRT’s massive FX purchases, the significant 
increase in foreign capital inflows has resulted in general stability in nominal exchange rates 
and a significant real exchange rate appreciation of the lira.  
Figure 16 
Nominal exchange rates 
Figure 17 
Real exchange rates 
  
Source: CBRT.  Source: CBRT. 
As capital inflows have increased significantly, there has been a coordinated response from 
the Treasury and the CBRT to excessive foreign exchange supply. While the Treasury has 
preferred to reduce FX or FX-linked debt stock, the CBRT has focused on building up FX 
reserves, consistent with the floating exchange rate regime as much as possible.  
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During 2004–06, the Treasury’s outstanding FX or FX-linked gross debt declined from 
USD  98 billion to USD 91.2 billion. The decline in FX or FX-linked debt/GDP was more 
impressive in the 2002–07 period, falling from 37.4% to 13.6% (Figures 18 and 19). This has 
reduced the government’s vulnerability to exchange rate volatility. 
Figure 18 
Gross debt stock 
(external + FX/FX-denominated/ 
domestic debt) 
In billions of US dollars 
Figure 19 
The Treasury’s gross FX- 
indexed domestic debt 
As a percentage of GDP 
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Source: Treasury.  Source: Treasury. 
In order to increase FX reserves, starting in April 2002, the CBRT began conducting 
transparent FX buying auctions. In order to secure transparency and reduce uncertainty 
around its activities in the FX market, the terms and conditions of these auctions were 
pre-announced. Moreover, to improve transparency, the CBRT started to announce annual 
FX buying auction programmes in 2005 and pledged not to change them unless significant 
changes in FX liquidity were observed. In addition to FX buying auctions, the CBRT has 
always announced the possibility of direct buying or selling interventions in case of excessive 
volatility in FX rates.  
During 2002–07, the CBRT purchased net USD 54.6 billion (Table 7), and the CBRT FX 
reserves increased from USD 18.6 billion to USD 72.3 billion (Figure 20).  
Table 7 
FX sales and purchases of the CBRT 
In billions of US dollars 
  CBRT FX purchases  CBRT FX sales  Net purchase 
2002   0.8   0.0   0.8 
2003   9.9   0.0   9.9 
2004   5.4   0.0   5.4 
2005   22.0    0.0   22.0 
2006   9.7   3.1   6.6 
2007   9.9   0.0   9.9 
Total   57.7    3.1   54.6 
Source: CBRT. BIS Papers No 44  481
 
 
Figure 20 
FX reserves of the CBRT 
In billions of US dollars 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CBRT. 
Because of these heavy FX purchases, there has been persistent excess TRY liquidity in the 
market. The CBRT’s sterilisation strategy has been to improve the coordination between its 
liquidity management and the Treasury’s debt management policies, and to withdraw 
remaining excess liquidity through open market operations (Figure 21). During 2002–07, as 
market conditions allowed, the Treasury increased the cash balances held with the CBRT to 
assist in the effective sterilisation of excess liquidity (Figure 22).  
Figure 21 
Excess TRY liquidity 
Figure 22 
The Treasury’s account 
with the CBRT 
In millions of TRY 
  
Source: CBRT.  Source: CBRT. 
The CBRT has withdrawn the excess liquidity mainly via TRY deposit operations in the 
Interbank Money Market within the CBRT and via overnight reverse repo transactions in the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange repo market.  
On the other hand, the CBRT Law empowers the CBRT to issue central bank liquidity bills for 
its own account with maturities up to 91 days that are tradable in the secondary markets. 
Within this legal framework, considering the fact that the upsurge in excess liquidity withdrawn 
via overnight maturity may undermine the efficiency and flexibility of monetary policies, the 
CBRT has decided to issue liquidity bills in addition to the existing open market instruments. 
The first group of liquidity bills, totalling TRY 735 million, was issued on 20 July 2007 with a 
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maturity of 32 days. The total amount of liquidity bills issued is TRY 3.3 billion. In July 2007, 
the CBRT also informed the market that if excess liquidity increased further and caused 
aggressiveness in the lending behaviour of the banking system, it would consider raising 
reserve requirements as an effective monetary policy instrument to withdraw excess liquidity 
permanently, and would prevent aggressive credit growth.  
Excessive amounts of liquidity sterilised with short-term maturity may cause aggressiveness 
in lending activity, reduce the effectiveness of liquidity management and interest rate policy 
and contribute to excessive volatility in foreign exchange markets in case of external shocks. 
Therefore, to improve the effectiveness of liquidity management, the CBRT’s strategy relies 
on a step-by-step approach: (i) up to some acceptable levels that will not trigger 
aggressiveness in banks’ lending behaviour, the excess liquidity is withdrawn by short-term 
(eg overnight or weekly) transactions; (ii) beyond these critical levels, coordination with the 
Treasury should be improved and excess liquidity should be withdrawn with longer 
maturities, in order to prevent a sharp increase in domestic credits; (iii) if the excess liquidity 
still prevails and the Treasury is reluctant to go ahead with more sterilisation, central bank 
bills should be actively used; and (iv) if the active use of the central bank bills is not enough 
to control the domestic credit growth caused by excess liquidity, reserve requirements should 
be considered as an effective monetary policy instrument that will support the central bank’s 
interest rate policy, although this is not currently popular in central banking. 
(b) Prudential  regulations 
In order to smooth out the effects of capital inflows on the economy, in addition to FX reserve 
build-up and effective liquidity management policies, the authorities have also focused on 
prudential regulations for the banking system in line with the financial stability objective.  
For this purpose, Turkey has concentrated on: (i) tight rules for the FX open positions, 
liquidity and capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of the banking system; (ii) transparency; (iii) risk 
management; and (iv) coordination with the CBRT and the Banking Regulation and 
Supervisory Authority (BRSA), rather than focusing on impediments to capital flows.  
The CAR requirement is set as 8%, but the target for this ratio is increased to 12%. Banks 
which do not meet this requirement are not allowed to open new branches. In addition to 
capital adequacy and liquidity ratios, the net FX positions of the banking system are closely 
monitored. According to current regulations, “the absolute value of the foreign exchange net 
open position/own funds” standard ratio may not exceed 20%.  
The BRSA also continues to maintain the capacity to evaluate the increasingly complex risk 
management procedures and risk models used by banks. More frequent on- and offsite bank 
examinations and increased reporting requirements (even daily for some types of data) are 
applied. Banks are examined according to a risk-based approach by taking all kinds of risks, 
including operational risk, into account. Moreover, stress testing has been enhanced. The 
Turkish authorities plan to implement Basel II as of January 2009. Finally, Turkey voluntarily 
joined the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) in 2006 to improve its financial 
system.  
Although the unconsolidated CAR of the banking sector (the ratio of own funds to risk-
weighted assets) declined from 31% in 2003 to 19% in 2007, it is still well above the target 
ratio of 12% (Figure 23). Accordingly, Turkish authorities always keep a close eye on the 
banking sector’s open FX positions. The sector has been behaving cautiously on foreign 
exchange risks, and the banks have a negligible foreign exchange net position (Figure 24).  
The authorities in Turkey focus not only on direct risks stemming from the banking system’s 
net FX open positions, but also on indirect risks stemming from those of the non-bank sector. 
In order to limit risks associated with the non-bank sector’s FX open positions, the CBRT has 
always warned the public about such risks and has supported the development of derivatives 
markets. For that reason, the CBRT conducts a detailed analysis on the net open positions of BIS Papers No 44  483
 
 
the non-bank firms by including all FX liabilities and assets in the Financial Stability Report, 
published every six months. As can be seen in Table 8, although the gross FX debt stock of 
the non-bank sector has increased significantly in recent years, the increase in net FX open 
positions has been relatively muted.  
Figure 23 
Capital adequacy ratio 
Figure 24 
Open FX positions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BRSA-CBRT.  Source: CBRT. 
 
Table 8 
FX positions of the non-banking sector 
In billions of US dollars 
  December 2005  December 2006  June 2007 
Change % 
(June 2007–
December 2006) 
Assets 49.5  67.1  72.4  8.0 
 Deposits  34.0  49.3  52.2  5.8 
 Securities  1.7  1.7  1.7  –4.8 
 Other  13.8  16.0  18.6  16.0 
Liabilities 76.6  104.5  123.4  18.1 
 Cash  loans  60.3  86.0  103.7  20.5 
 Domestic  21.1  25.1  28.6  13.8 
 Foreign  39.3  60.9  75.1  23.3 
 Other  16.3  18.5  19.8  6.8 
Net position  –27.1  –37.4  –51.0  36.3 
Source: Financial Stability Report, November 2007. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In recent years there has been a shift in the amount and structure of capital inflows to 
Turkey. As the amount of these inflows have reached unprecedented levels, the share of FDI 
and longer-term private sector credits has increased significantly. Taking into account the 
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structural changes in macroeconomic policies and improvements in economic fundamentals, 
it may be concluded that country-specific pull factors, rather than favourable global liquidity 
conditions, have been the main driver of capital inflows. 
Although capital inflows have supported a rate of economic growth which has significantly 
exceeded historical averages, the CBRT has faced some challenges involving excess FX 
and TRY liquidity. In order to manage these challenges, the CBRT has focused on the FX 
reserve build-up without interrupting the floating exchange rate regime and effective 
sterilisation of excess TRY liquidity to control inflationary pressures. Furthermore, tight rules 
on capital and liquidity adequacy and FX open positions of the banking system have been 
maintained.  
The main challenge for emerging countries, especially Turkey, will be to sustain capital 
inflows in case of changes in global liquidity conditions. In recent years, as a result of a rise 
in foreign investors’ share in domestic markets and increased financial integration, the 
sensitivity of domestic markets and domestic credit conditions to developed country markets 
has increased significantly. This has been particularly apparent during recent periods of 
volatility in global financial markets. Of course, it will not be possible to avoid all the negative 
effects of a worsening in global liquidity conditions in the short run, but emerging countries 
can limit these negative effects by sustaining credible monetary and fiscal policies and 
structural reforms. 